We design envy-free mechanisms for the allocation of rooms and rent payments among roommates. We achieve four objectives: (1) each agent is allowed to make a report that expresses her preference about violating her budget constraint, a feature not achieved by mechanisms that only elicit quasi-linear reports; (2) these reports are finite dimensional; (3) computation is feasible in polynomial time; and (4) incentive properties of envy-free mechanisms that elicit quasi-linear reports are preserved.
Introduction
We design envy-free mechanisms for the allocation of rooms and payments of rent among roommates who collectively lease a house. Our objective is to account for agents' budget constraints and the difficulty the agents have in paying above these constraints. We show that this can be done without losing the computational complexity and the incentive properties of the mechanisms that are currently in use.
The so-called equitable rent allocation problem has attracted the attention of both economists and computer scientists (Gal et al., 2017; Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018; see Velez, 2018 , for a survey of incentives related studies). 1 Recently, the theoretical results of both fields have been put in practice. Most prominently the not-for-profit fair allocation website Spliddit.org (Goldman and Procaccia, 2014) has attracted thousands of users to its fair rent calculator. Currently, this system asks roommates for their values for the rooms and calculates an envy-free allocation that maximizes the minimum utility for that report. Generically there is a continuum of envy-free allocations for each economy. Survey evidence suggests that the maxmin utility selection is on a sweet spot that balances additional intuitive criteria of equity (Gal et al., 2017) .
Spliddit users have provided feedback on its performance. Among the prominent issues that they have pointed to is that quasi-linear reports do not allow them to express their budget restrictions (Procaccia et al., 2018) . As an answer to these requests, Procaccia et al. (2018) propose to ask agents for both their valuation of the rooms and their budget constraint. Then they determine, with a polynomial algorithm, whether the set of envy-free allocations that satisfy the budget constraints for the reported quasi-linear preference is non-empty. If this is so, they calculate an allocation that maximizes the minimum utility among agents in this set. If the set is empty, they calculate an envy-free allocation for the reported values that is closest to satisfy budget constrains. In this second case, an envy-free allocation with respect to the reported values may not be envy-free for the agents' real preferences. It may not even be Pareto efficient. Essentially, the problem is that by requesting only quasi-linear values and budget constraints we may not get a good idea of the preference map of the agents when allotments involve violations of their budget constraint (see Sec. 3 for a detailed discussion).
Obviously if one could ask the agents for their complete preference map this would not be a problem. This is not realistic, however. Most importantly, even if it were feasible to ask for this information, we would have two additional significant problems. The first is computational complexity (Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018) . The second is incentives. If agents' reports are required to be quasi-linear, for each complete information prior (quasi-linear or not), the set of limit equilibrium outcomes of each envyfree mechanism is the set of envy-free allocations for true preferences (Velez, 2015) . 2 This property is lost if agents can report arbitrary continuous utility 1 Earlier complexity analyses are Aragones (1995) and Klijn (2000) . 2 The direct revelation game of a social choice function that selects envy-free allocations may not have Nash equilibria unless it brake ties, i.e., selects among allocations that are welfare equivalent for all agents, in elaborate and arguably impractical ways (Velez, 2018) . By contrast, limit equilibria always exist for all such games. See Velez (2018) for functions that are only restricted to be decreasing in payments of money for each given room (Velez, 2015) .
This leads us to state our desiderata for the redesign of an envy-free mechanism with budget constraints: (1) agents should be allowed to make reports that express their preferences about violating budget constraints; (2) these reports should be finite dimensional; (3) computation of a maxmin utility envy-free allocation, or another selection from the envy-free set, given the reports should be feasible in polynomial time; and (4) incentive properties of envy-free mechanisms that elicit quasi-linear reports should be preserved.
We submit that we can achieve these objectives by allowing each agent to report valuations for each room, her budget constraint, and an additional number that we interpret as an index that penalizes violations of the budget constraint. Formally, if agent i receives room a and pays p i for it when her budget constraint is b i and her budget violation index is ρ i ≥ 1, this agent's utility is: v ia − p i − ρ i max{0, p i − b i }. In practical terms, we can interpret ρ i as the interest rate at which agent i has access to credit.
Intuitively, this preference domain achieves our first objective of design (see Sec. 3 for a discussion). Our second objective is obviously satisfied. It remains to settle complexity and incentive issues.
1. We construct a polynomial algorithm, with input size the number of agents, to compute a maxmin utility envy-free allocation for quasi-linear budget constrained preferences for a fixed number of possible budget violation indices.
2. We prove that when the admissible domain of preferences is the quasilinear budget constrained preferences with an upper bound on the budget valuation index, the set of limit equilibrium outcomes of each complete information game of any envy-free direct revelation mechanism, is the set of envy-free allocations for true preferences.
3. The algorithms in 1 can be adapted to compute a selection of the envy-free set that maximizes the minimum of linear transformation of rent payments, or minimizes the maximum of linear transformation of utility or rent payments. As an application, we show that there is a polynomial algorithm that determines if a given economy admits an envy-free allocation in which no agent is compensated to receive a room.
Our results are significant contributions to both theoretical computer science, in particular computational fair division, and economics. We propose a mechanism for a relevant problem that arises because traditional a discussion on the merits of the limit equilibrium prediction for these games.
linear structures are not rich enough to represent real-world needs; we show that this mechanism can be practically implemented; and by analyzing its complete information incentives we advance our understanding of the extent to which utility maximizing behavior can lead to suboptimal outcomes when the mechanism is operated.
At a technical level, our paper is closely related with Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) who provide an algorithm that computes an envy-free allocation for piece-wise linear preferences, a domain containing our budget constrained preferences. The algorithm they construct does not allow one to choose a specific allocation within the envy-free set, as the minmax utility allocation. Our algorithm shares some features with Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) 's, of which we give a detailed account in Sec. 4. The novelty of our contribution is that we leverage the topological structure and the monotonicity properties of the envy-free set studied by Alkan et al. (1991) and in order to construct our algorithm and to provide a complete analysis of efficiency and correctness. On the economics front, our paper joins the literature on market design and in particular the incentives analysis of the rent division problem. It is closely related with the papers that analyze incentives when preferences may not be quasi-linear (Velez, 2011 (Velez, , 2015 Andersson et al., 2014a,b; Fujinaka and Wakayama, 2015; see Velez, 2018 for a survey). We provide details of this relationship in Sec. 5.
Model
A set of n objects, A, that we refer to as rooms, is to be allocated among a set of n agents N ≡ {1, ..., n}. Generic rooms are a, b, .... Each agent is to receive a room and pay an amount of money for it. Agent i generic allotment is (r a , a) ∈ R × A. When r a ≥ 0 we interpret this as the amount of money agent i pays to receive room a. We allow for negative payments of rent, i.e., r a < 0. In this way we allow for alternative interpretations of our model, as the allocation of tasks and salary. Each agent has a continuous preference on her outcome space, i.e., a complete and transitive binary relation on R × A that is represented by a continuous utility function. The generic utility function is u i . We assume throughout that preferences satisfy the following two properties: 3 (1) money-monotonicity, i.e., for each consumption bundle (r a , a) and each δ > 0, u i (r a + δ, a) < u i (r a , a); and (2) compensation assumption, i.e., for each pair of rooms a and b, and each r a ∈ R, there is t b ∈ R such that u i (r a , a) = u i (t b , b). Denote the domain of 3 Our ordinal assumptions on preference imply existence of continuous representations. these preferences by U . Two finite-dimensional subdomains of preferences are of interest to us.
Quasi-linear preferences: there is a vector (v ia ) a∈A ∈ R A such that agent i's utility from receiving room a and paying p i for it is v ia − p i . We denote the domain of these preferences by Q.
Budget constrained quasi-linear preferences (with maximal budget violation index ρ > 0): the agent has underlying quasi-linear preferences with values (v ia ) a∈A , a budget constraint b i ≥ 0, and a proportional loss of utility from violating her budget with coefficient ρ i ∈ [0, ρ]. The agent's utility from receiving room a and paying p a for it is v ia − p a − ρ i max{0, p a − b i }. We denote the domain of these preferences by B.
Individual payments should add up to m ∈ R, the house rent. It is convenient for us to consider a variable set of agents, rooms, and rent. This allows us to describe redistribution of resources among subgroups. For C ⊆ A, let U (C) be the space of preferences on R × C satisfying money-monotonicity and the compensation assumption. Consistently, let Q(C) and B(C) be the sub-domains of U (C) of quasi-linear and budget constrained quasi-linear preferences, respectively. An economy is a tuple e ≡ (M, C, u, l) where M ⊆ N , C ⊆ A is such that |C| = |M |, u ∈ U (C) M , and l ∈ R. Since the set of agents N and resources A and m are fixed in our main results, we simply describe an economy (N, A, u, m) by the profile u ∈ U N . An allocation for (M, C, u, l) is a pair (r, σ) where σ : M → C is a bijection and r ≡ (r a ) a∈C is such that a∈C r a = l. The allotment assigned to agent i by allocation (r, σ) is (r σ(i) , σ(i)). We denote the set of allocations for (M, C, u, l) by Z(M, C, l). We simplify and write Z for Z(N, A, m). An allocation is envy-free for e ≡ (M, C, u, l) if no agent prefers the consumption of any other agent at the allocation. The set of these allocations is F (e).
Let D ⊆ U . A social choice correspondence (scc) defined on D N associates with each u ∈ D N a set of allocations. The generic scc defined on D N is G : D N ⇒ Z. We reserve the notation F for the scc that associates with each u ∈ U N the set of envy-free allocations for u. A social choice function (scf) is a single-valued scc. The generic scf defined on D N is g : D N → Z. We say that an scc G defined on D N is envy-free if for each
An scf g defined on a domain D N induces a direct revelation mechanism in which each agent reports a preference in D and the outcome is the allocation recommended by g for the reports. We denote this mechanism by (N, D N , g) and the induced complete information game for preference profile u ∈ U N by (N, D N , g, u) . 4 Let D ⊆ U , u ∈ U N , g an scf, and ε > 0. A profile v ∈ D N is an ε-equilibrium of (N, D N , g, u) if no agent can gain more than ε in utility by choosing a different action, i.e., for each i ∈ N and each
An allocation z is a limit Nash equilibrium outcome of (N, D N , g, u) if there is a sequence of its ε-equilibrium outcomes that converges to z as ε vanishes.
The problem
A direct revelation game, i.e., a game in which agents are asked to report their private information, is different from a protocol in which agents report a "message" which has the only purpose of allowing them to coordinate on an allocation. In a direct revelation game, whose associated scf is based on normative considerations, there is an implicit commitment of the mechanism designer to achieve the normative goals he or she champions when the agents provide the true reports.
Several issues may arise if the domain of admissible preferences in a direct revelation game is not rich enough to approximate the agents' true preferences. First, strategy spaces may be confusing because they can be asking for information that is not well defined. Think for instance of a budget constrained agent who is asked to report her values for the different rooms. What does this really mean? To alleviate this problem the mechanism designer may have to resort to an alternative framing of the preference query. For instance, in our rent allocation problem, Spliddit asks users to assign a rent to each room in a way that the total rent is collected and the agent is indifferent between receiving each room with the corresponding rent. This question has always a true answer for each preference in U . Moreover, when preferences are quasi-linear, it determines the complete preference map. Calculating an envy-free allocation with quasi-linear values elicited in this way may not lead to an envy-free allocation for the true preferences, however. For instance, suppose that an agent reports the value of room a is $500 and the value of room b is $300 when her budget constraint is $400 because she is actually indifferent between these two bundles. The system may recommend her to go to room b paying $200 while the agent who is assigned room a pays $400 (this of course requires that there is at least another agent in the problem). The agent will most likely prefer the 4 Note that we refer to (N, D N , g, u) as a direct revelation game, even though u may not be in D N .
allotment of the agent who is assigned room a. Even thought the user may be doing her best effort to answer truthfully, she finds that the systems does not deliver on its promise to recommend an allotment in which she does not prefer the allotment of any other agent. It is difficult to assign responsibility to this specific issue, but the result is that Spliddit users have explicitly asked for the system to account for their budget constraint (Procaccia et al., 2018) .
Allowing agents to report continuous utility functions that are decreasing in payments is simply not realistic. One does not need to go that far to achieve a better expressiveness of preferences, however. It is possible to enlarge the quasi-linear domain so the resulting space is determined by finitely many parameters and also allows users to convey the information of their budget constraint and the difficulty in violating it. Domain B is an obvious candidate, first suggested by Velez (2018) .
One can elicit the relevant information of a preference in B as follows. First, as Spliddit, one can ask the agent to assign a rent to each room in a way that the total rent is collected and the agent is indifferent between receiving each room with the corresponding rent. Then ask for her budget constraint. Finally, elicit the budget violation index whenever needed. There are three cases.
1. The agent is budget constrained and the individual rents assigned to the rooms are all weakly below the agent's budget: In this case there is no need to ask any further question. If one proceeds calculating an envy-free allocation for a quasi-linear preference with the reported values, the agent will always be assigned a room whose rent is below the budget constraint.
2. The agent assigns different rents to at least two rooms and at least one rent is above the budget: If the rent assigned to each room is above budget, let x be the minimal budget violation. Otherwise, let x be zero. Then one can ask the agent for the equivalent of a rebate of x + 1 dollars for the room that is assigned the higher rent and the one that is assigned the lowest. 5 To enforce reported preferences are in our admissible domain, the agent can be given as options a subset of [x + 1, x +ρ]. (Our complexity results will apply to a finite set of possible reports).
3. The agent assigns equal rents to each room (and all above budget): In this case the agent has quasi-linear preferences represented by equal values. If we are to calculate an ordinal selection from the envy-free set, as the one that maximizes the minimal payment of rent, we do not need to inquire for the budget violation index. If we are to calculate a cardinal selection, we need to ask the agent to asses how difficult for him or her is to go over the budget compared to the roommates, or to a certain population. Then, use the corresponding statistic calculated from the population or an available sample. 6
Enlarging the domain of admissible preferences in the direct revelation mechanism of an envy-free scf brings two challenges.
Complexity
The first practical issue that arises if one enlarges the domain of admissible preferences to B is computational complexity. When preferences are quasi-linear, an envy-free allocation can be computed in polynomial time (Aragones, 1995; Klijn, 2000; Gal et al., 2017) , as well as an envy-free allocation that maximizes the minimum value of a set of linear functions of the payoffs among all envy-free allocations (Gal et al., 2017) . The most prominent solution from this family, which is currently operated by Spliddit (Gal et al., 2017) , is the maxmin utility envy-free solution, i.e., for each economy e recommend an element in R(e) ≡ arg max
The following theorem summarizes our leading applications. 
Compute an allocation that maximizes the minimum rent paid by an agent in F (N, A, u, m). This algorithm determines if there is an allocation in F (N, A, u, m) at which no agent is compensated.
We limit our presentation to the maxmin utility solution and discuss extensions in Sec. 6. Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) introduced an algorithm that calculates an envy-free allocation when preferences are represented by piecewise linear functions, a domain containing B. 7 When preferences are in B and the number of different values of the budget violation index that an agent can report is finite, say k, their algorithm runs in O(n k+c ) for some c > 0 (Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018, Sec. 4 .1). 8 Their algorithm does not produce an allocation satisfying further criteria, as the maxmin utility or maxmin rent. Since our approach shares a similar philosophy with Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) 's, it is convenient for our purposes to first explain how their algorithm works, its relationship with the so-called Perturbation Lemma of Alkan et al. (1991) , and then introduce our algorithms and analysis.
The essential step of the algorithms that we will discuss and construct is the following. Starting from an envy-free allocation, decrease the rent of each room and reshuffle rooms so no-envy is preserved. This is always locally possible. For each piece-wise linear u, and each (r, σ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m), there is ε > 0 such that for each δ ∈ (0, ε) there is (t, µ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m − δ) such that for each a ∈ A, t a < r a Alkan et al. (1991) . A discussion of this result is relevant to develop intuition for our algorithms.
and for each i ∈ N and a ∈ A, ν ia (u, r) and λ ia (u, r) be such that for some ε > 0 and each , u, m) . A rebate of rent is a vector x ∈ R A ++ and a reshuffle is a bijection µ : N → A. At rebate and reshuffle (x, µ) at r, agent i receives bundle (r µ(i) − x µ(i) , µ(i)). Utility function u induces a utility function on rebates and reshuffles at r, given by (x a , a) → u i (r a − x a , a). Suppose that agent i is indifferent between bundles (r a , a) and (r b , b).
7 A piece-wise linear utility function has the form (ri, a) → vias − λiasri for a collection of consecutive intervals {I i as } a∈A,s∈S i that covers R. Even though we will state all our results for our domain B, they all generalize for the piece-wise linear domain when we require for each i, |S i | is polynomial in n. 8 The leading algorithm in Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) solves the case in which slopes are integer powers of a given (1 + ε). With this they construct an approximate envy-free allocation for an arbitrary piece-wise linear economy. The approximation is polynomial in 1/ε. Since our objective is to provide more expressive but simple preferences to the agents, we prefer to present only results for finitely many slopes. The generalization of this results when one allows agents provide reports for the budget violation index in an interval and then calculate an approximate envy-free allocation for this economy are guaranteed by Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) approximation technique.
Then her preferences between rebates with these rooms are linear for a neighborhood of zero. That is, for each rebate x small enough, (r a − x a , a) is at least as good as (r b − x b , b) if and only if λ ia (u, r)x a ≥ λ ib (u, r)x b . Each agent may not be indifferent among all bundles in (r, σ). Thus the economy of rebates and reshuffles may not be linear. However, since we aim to rebate only a small amount of money, we can linearize this economy as follows.
Proofs omitted in the body of the paper are presented in the Appendix.
Definition 3. Let u ∈ B N and (r, σ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m). A linearized rebates and reshuffles economy for u at (r, σ) is an economy in which consumption space is R ++ × A, and preferences are represented, for Λ satisfying the property in Lemma 1, by: for each i ∈ N and
Let u ∈ B N and (r, σ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m). A linearized rebates and reshuffles economy for u at (r, σ) is isomorphic to a quasi-linear rent allocation economy in which preferences are strictly increasing in money, i.e., an economy in which the alternatives space is R × A and agents have preferences (y a , a) →û(y a , a) ≡ log λ ia (u, r, Λ) + y a . Thus, we can use all the power of the results for the quasi-linear domain in this economy. In particular, let µ be an assignment that maximizes i∈N λ iµ(i) (u, r, Λ) and let ε ∈ R. There is (y, µ) ∈ F (N, A,û, ε) (Alkan et al., 1991) . Since the economy is quasi-linear, for each η ∈ R, ((y a + η) a∈A , µ) ∈ F (N, A,û, ε + nη). Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, for each ε > 0 we can construct an allocation in the linearized rebates and reshuffles economy (y, µ) ∈ F (N, A,û, a∈A y a ) such that a∈A exp(y a ) = ε. We have the problem that utility values in the linearized economy does not correspond exactly to our original rebate and reshuffles economy. However, if ε is chosen close enough to zero, for
Thus, the preferences statements that pass from the linearized rebates and reshuffles economy to the original rebates and reshuffles economy are enough to guarantee that (r − exp(y), µ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m − ε).
The following graphs allow us to summarize the discussion above in one lemma.
Definition 4 (Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018) . For u ∈ B N and (r, σ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m), let F(r) ≡ (N, A, E) be the bipartite graph were (i, a) ∈ E if u i (r σ(i) , σ(i)) = u i (r a , a); and F u (r) ≡ (N, A, E, w) the weighted version of F(r) were for each (i, a) ∈ E, w(i, a) ≡ log λ ia (u, r).
Lemma 2 (Perturbation Lemma; Alkan et al., 1991; Arunachaleswaran et al., 2018) . Let (r, σ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m). Suppose that u is piece-wise linear and µ is a maximum weight perfect matching in
Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) leverage Lemma 2 to construct a polynomial algorithm to find an envy-free allocation in a piece-wise linear economy in which the slopes in the different intervals comes from a finite set say of cardinality k. The essential step in this task is the following. Given η > 0, starting from an envy-free allocation (r, σ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m) with u ∈ B N , rebate η > 0 so no-envy and budget violations are preserved. Lemma 2 itself does not solve this problem, i.e., stacking the εs produced by the lemma, may not allow one to reach a rebate of η (Alkan, 1989) . Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) 's breakthrough is to realize that this can be done by concatenating the solution of the following linear program for a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r), µ:
(1) This problem is feasible because r is in the option set. Thus, let (t, σ) be the allocation associated with its solution. Since t satisfies the second set of constraints in (1), the allocation is in F (N, A, u, m − ε) for some 0 < ε ≤ η. Thus, one of the following is true: (i) the solution is in F (N, A, u, m − η); Algorithm 1 Initializes search of maxmin utility envy-free allocation.
Input: (N, A, u, m) were u ∈ B N is associated with (v ia ) i∈N,a∈A , (b i ) i∈N , and (ρ i ) i∈N ∈ {ρ 1 , ..., ρ k } N . Onput: M ≥ m and an allocation in R(N, A, u, M ).
Let σ be an assignment that maximizes i∈N V iσ(i) . 4: Compute a price vector r ∈ R A by solving the linear program
Returns M ≡ a∈A r a and (r, σ).
(ii) the solution hit one of the B u (r) constraints; or (iii) σ is not a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (t). (If these three conditions simultaneously fail, by Lemma 2, t would not be a solution to the problem.) If one repeats this starting from the previously computed allocation, eventually case (i) or (ii) happen in O(n k−1 ), because since there are k values for the slopes of the intervals, the maximum number of values for a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (s) for any s ∈ R A is bounded above by (n + 1) k−1 .
Thus, for k constant, one can construct a polynomial algorithm that stops in O(n k+c ς), where ς is the number of intervals in the piece-wise linear representation of preferences. In our case, with preferences in B, ς is bounded above by 2n 2 . Thus, the algorithm runs in O(n k+c ).
A solution to (1) leads us to a random envy-free allocation. We would like to be able to direct the algorithm to optimize some further criteria. The following algorithms calculate in polynomial time a maxmin envyfree allocation for an economy (N, A, u, m) with preferences in B. The first, Algorithm 1, calculates a maxmin envy-free allocation for an economy (N, A, u, M ) for some M ≥ m that is selected high enough so all budget constraints are violated necessarily.
Algorithm 1 initializes our search by looking for an allocation for a rent M that is high enough so we make sure that all budget constraints will be violated for each agent, for each consumption of the agent or the other agents, at each possible envy-free allocation for (N, A, u, M ). For such a high rent preferences are quasi-linear in the range of the consumption space that contains all envy-free allocations for (N, A, u, M ). Thus, one can find a maxmin allocation by essentially using Gal et al. (2017) 's algorithm for this quasi-linear preference (lines 3-4).
Theorem 2. For k fixed, Algorithm 1 stops in polynomial time with input size n. Given input (N, A, u, m) where u ∈ B, the algorithm returns M and (r, σ) such that M ≥ m and (r, σ) ∈ R(N, A, u, M ).
Proof. Lines 1 and 2 are direct definitions. Line 3 is well known to be polynomial in n. For line 4 we should note that it is indeed a linear program, because allũs are linear in r (at this point σ is fixed). It is feasible because given a quasi-linear economy and an assignment σ that maximizes the summation of values, there is always an envy-free allocation for that economy with that assignment (Alkan et al., 1991) . Because of the second and third sets of constraints in the program, the feasible set is compact. Thus, the program has a solution. Since the number of constraints in the program is polynomial in n, the complexity of solving this problem is known to be polynomial in n. Let M and (r, σ) be the output of the algorithm. Clearly, M ≥ m. We claim that (r, σ) ∈ R(N, A, u, M ). Since for each i ∈ N , (1 + ρ i ) > 0, profileũ is ordinally equivalent to the quasi-linear profile with values V . Thus, the solution of the linear program in line 4 solves max r∈R A :(r,σ)∈F (N,A,ũ,M ) min l∈Lũi (r σ(i) , σ(i)).
Let (t, µ) ∈ R(N, A,ũ, M ). Sinceũ is ordinally equivalent to a quasilinear preference and {(r, σ), (t, µ)} ⊆ F (N, A,ũ, M ), (t, σ) ∈ F (N, A,ũ, M ) (Svensson, 2009) . Moreover, by Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991) (max j∈N b j , a) . Suppose that (t, µ) ∈ F (N, A,ũ, M ). Thus, for each a ∈ A, t a ≥ max j∈N b j , for otherwiseũ i will envy the agent who receives a at (t, µ). Thus, for each pair
Since F (N, A,ũ, M ) = F (N, A, u, M ); for each (t, µ) ∈ F (N, A, u, M ) and each i ∈ N , u(t µ(i) , µ(i)) =ũ(t µ(i) , µ(i)), and (r, σ) ∈ R(N, A,ũ, M ), we have that (r, σ) ∈ R(N, A, u, M ).
If Algorithm 1 returns M = m, we have actually computed an element of R (N, A, u, m) . Thus, we need to continue our search only when this algorithm returns M > m and (r, σ) ∈ R(N, A, u, M ). Algorithm 2 does so. This algorithm shares some of its philosophy with Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) 's. At a given state in which an allocation in R(N, A, u, m ′ ) with m ′ > m has been calculated, it reshuffles rooms and rebates rent by solving (2), an LP that maximizes the minimum value of the u i s constrained by budget regime changes.
As in Arunachaleswaran et al. (2018) 's algorithm, solving (2) gets us closer to collecting exacly rent m. The solution to this problem, t s , may be such that (t s , σ s ) ∈ R(N, A, u, a∈A t s a ), however. There are two issues that cause this problem. First, (2) has constraints additional to the envyfree ones. Second, since preferences are not quasi-linear, we do not know that a given assignment that admits an envy-free allocation necessarily admits a maxmin utility envy-free allocation -this is the reason why Gal et al. (2017) 's algorithm works in the quasi-linear domain. Thus, since our objective is a maxmin utility envy-free allocation, it is plausible that this step may overshoot rebating rent and lose the maxmin property.
Thus, if the solution of (2) excessively reduces rent, i.e., line 11 is reached, we need to correct the situation. We do so by grabbing the value of (2), R s , and increase rents again constrained by no-envy and maxmin utility R s , i.e., we solve (3). It turns out that the solution to (3) fits the bill, i.e., it is a maxmin utility envy-free allocation with value R s . Most importantly, and here is where the subtlety of our analysis resides, compared with t s , the solution to (3) does not decrease any of the fundamental measures of progress in our algorithm. That is, at a solution of (3), r s , either σ s is not a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r s ) or a new budget constraint was released. Algorithm 2 Calculates a maxmin envy-free allocation.
M > m, and (r, σ) ∈ R(N, A, u, M ). Onput: an allocation in R (N, A, u, m) .
Let σ s be a maximum weight perfect matching in F u (r s−1 )
7:
Let t s ∈ R A and R s be solution and value of the following LP
8:
r s ← t s .
10:
else
11:
Let r s be the solution to the following LP
12:
end if 13: end while 14: Return (r s , σ s ).
The first step in the proof of the theorem is to realize that the Perturbation Lemma can be strengthened to guarantee that perturbations preserve the maxmin utility property. Intuitively, Lemma 3 guarantees that the solution to (2) will decrease the aggregate rent we are collecting. Now, suppose that we are at some iteration of Algorithm 2 for s > 0 in which we find that (t s , σ s ) ∈ R(N, A, u, a∈A t s a ). Intuitively the solution of (3) will bring us back to an element of R(N, A, u, m ′ ) for some m ′ < a∈A t s a . This is not enough to guarantee the algorithm will stop. In order for this to be so, it must be the case that the set of aggregate rents m ′ < a∈A t s a for which there is an allocation with assignment σ s in R(N, A,ũ, m ′ ) is connected. Imagine that there is a lacuna, i.e., some interval (m 1 , m 2 ) for which no such allocation exist. If the solution to (2) jumps to a∈A t s a ∈ (m 1 , m 2 ), then the solution to (3) may bring us back to m 2 , and the while loop may get trapped in an infinite cycle.
Thus, to prove Theorem 3 we need to guarantee the connectedness properties of the aforementioned set (Lemma 5 below). Note that by Lemma 3, a maximal lacuna, say (m 1 , m 2 ), cannot exist for m 2 for which there is (t, σ s ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m 2 ) such that σ s is a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (t). Thus, we can prove that such a lacuna does not exist by establishing a converse to Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 (Converse perturbation lemma). Let u ∈ B N , ε > 0, (r, σ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m) and (t, σ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m − ε) such that for each a ∈ A, r a > t a . Suppose that B u (r) = B u (t). Then, σ is a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r).
Let u ∈ B N . For each (r, σ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m) and each µ that is a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r), let ε((r, σ), u, µ) ≡ sup{ε > 0 :
Lemma 5. Let u ∈ B N , (r, σ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m), µ a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r), and ε ≡ ε((r, σ), u, µ). Then,
(b) If (r ε , µ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m − ε), then µ is not a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r ε ).
(c) There is no η > ε such that for some r η ∈ R A such that a∈A r η a = m − η and B u (r η ) = B u (r ε ), (r η , µ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m − η).
Proof of Theorem 3.
We prove that the processes in each line of the algorithm are well defined and can be individually completed in polynomial time. Then we bound the number of times the while loop is visited.
For each s ≥ 1, (r s−1 , σ s ) ∈ F (N, A, u, a∈A r s−1 a ), because it is either the input when s = 0 or the solution to either (2) or (3), which have noenvy constraints. As long as (r s−1 , σ s ) ∈ F (N, A, u, a∈A r s−1 a ), r s−1 is in the feasible set of (2). Because of the first and last constraints, this set is compact. Thus, it has a solution. Since it is a linear program with a polynomial number of constraints, it can be computed in polynomial time.
Line 9 can be completed in polynomial time, i.e., given t s ∈ R A and σ s : N → A a bijection, (t, σ) ∈ R(N, A, u, a∈A t a ) is verifiable in polynomial time. By Velez (Proposition 5.9 2018), this problem is equivalent to check that the allocation is envy-free and that for a given directed graph with n nodes, there is a path from each node to a given set of nodes.
Because of the first and second constraint in (3), the feasible set in this program is compact. 11 Since t s belongs to this feasible set, the program has a solution.
We claim that the algorithm stops. Moreover, if it returns (r s , σ s ), s is bounded by n k+2 . Thus, the algorithm runs in O(n k+c ) for some c > 2.
Suppose that we update s in line 4, a∈A r s−1 a > m, and (r s−1 , σ s−1 ) ∈ R(N, A, u, a∈A r s−1 a ). Let t s be the solution to (2). Then, (t s , σ s ) ∈ F (N, A, u, a∈A t s a ). Thus, σ s is a perfect matching in F u (t s ). There are two cases.
Case 1: (t s , σ s ) ∈ R(N, A, u, a∈A t s a ). If a∈A t s a = m, the algorithm terminates. Suppose then that a∈A t s a > m. We claim that it must be the case that either there is (i, a) ∈ SB u (r s−1 ) such that t s a = b i , or σ s is not a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (t s ). Suppose by contradiction that for each (i, a) ∈ SB u (r s−1 ), t s a > b i , and σ s is a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (t s ). By Lemma 3, there is δ > 0 and t δ ∈ R A such that (t δ , σ s ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m − δ); for each a ∈ A, t δ a < t s a ≤ r s−1 a ; for each (i, a) ∈ SB u (r s−1 ), t δ a > b i ; and a∈A t δ a > m; and for each
. Thus, t s is not a solution to (2). This is a contradiction.
Case 2: (t s , σ s ) ∈ R(N, A, u, a∈A t s a ). Let r s be the solution of (3). We claim that (r s , σ s ) ∈ R(N, A, u, a∈A r s a ). Since (r s−1 , σ s−1 ) ∈ R(N, A, u, a∈A r s−1 a ), by Lemma 3, min i∈Nũi (r
Thus, min i∈Nũi (r s−1 , σ s ) < min i∈Nũi (r s , σ s ). Let i ∈ N . Using the notation in Definition 6 in the Appendix, by Velez (Proposition 5.9 2018), there is j ∈ arg min i∈Nũi (r σ s (j) ). By Velez (2018, Lemma 5.7), r s σ s (i) < r s−1 σ s (i) . Thus, for each a ∈ A, r s < r s−1 .
Let ε ≡ ε((r s−1 , σ s ), u, σ s ) and (r ε , σ s ) ∈ R(N, A, u, a∈A r s−1 − ε). Let R ε ≡ min i∈Nũi (r ε , σ s ). We claim that R s ≤ R ε . Suppose by contradiction that R s > R ε . Then, for each a ∈ N , r s a < r ε a . Since B u (r s ) = B u (r ε ), by Lemma 4, σ s is a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r ε ). This contradicts Lemma 5. For each δ ∈ [0, ε], there is a unique r δ ∈ R A such that (r δ , σ s ) ∈ R(N, A, u, a∈A r s−1 − δ) (Alkan et al., 1991) . The function δ → r δ is strictly decreasing and continuous . By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is δ ∈ [0, ε] such that R δ ≡ min i∈N u i (r δ , σ s ) = R s . Then, for each a ∈ A, r s ≤ r δ . Then, r δ is feasible in (3). Note that since r s solves (3), then a∈A r s a ≥ a∈A r δ a . Thus, r δ = r s . Thus, (r s , σ s ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m − δ). Note that (r s , σ s ) solves (2). Thus, by Case 1, either the algorithm stops or either there is (i, a) ∈ SB u (r s−1 ) such that t s a = b i , or σ s is not a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (t s ).
By Case 1 and 2, each time that s is updated, either |SB u (r s )| < |SB u (r s−1 )| or the weight of σ s in F u (r s−1 ) is greater than the weight of σ s−1 in F u (r s−2 ). There are at most n 2 elements in SB u (r 0 ) and at most (n + 1) k−1 values for the weight of a perfect matching. Thus, the algorithm either stops or reaches a state in which SB u (r s ) = ∅ in O(n k+c ) for some c > 0. If SB u (r s ) = ∅, the algorithm returns the solution to (2) in the next while loop iteration because thenũ s becomes quasi-linear and thus ε((r s , σ s+1 ),ũ, σ s+1 ) = +∞.
Incentives
If only quasi-linear reports are allowed, the direct revelation mechanism of each envy-free scf has the property that all of its non-cooperative outcomes are always envy-free allocations. 12 Theorem 4 (Velez, 2018) . Let g be an envy-free scf defined on Q N . Then, for each u ∈ U N the set of limit equilibrium outcomes of (N, Q N , g, u) is F (u).
12 Dominant strategy implementation is impossible in this setting (Alkan et al., 1991; Tadenuma and Thomson, 1995; Velez, 2018) .
Incentive properties of envy-free mechanisms may be lost by enlarging the set of admissible reports. Indeed, one can construct an envy-free g and a profile u ∈ Q N for which there is a limit equilibrium outcome of (N, U N , g, u) that is neither envy-free nor Pareto efficient for u (Velez, 2015) . The known examples require profiles of reports that are outside B. Intuitively, the issue seems to arise because agents exaggerate the sensitivity they have to increases of rent for the room they receive. Thus, it is plausible that a result like Theorem 4 holds when the admissible domain of preferences is enlarged to B. Our main result in this section states that this is actually so.
Theorem 5. Let g be an envy-free scf defined on B N . Then, for each u ∈ U N , the set of limit equilibrium outcomes of (N, B N , g, u) is F (u).
One can see Theorem 5 as the conjunction of two independent statements. First, when reports are constrained to be in B, each limit equilibrium outcome of the direct revelation game of an envy-free scf is envy-free for the true preferences. Second, each envy-free allocation for true preferences is a limit equilibrium outcome of the direct revelation game of an envy-free scf. We will concentrate on providing intuition for the first statement. Lemma 7, which is stated at the end of this section and follows from a somehow standard argument, reveals that the second statement holds for any enlargement of the quasi-linear domain.
The reason why extending the set of reports in an envy-free mechanism can create unwanted limit equilibria is the same reason why proving Theorem 5 is a somehow subtle problem: A limit equilibrium outcome is not the precise recommendation for a given report; it is the limit of recommendations for a sequence of reports that can be increasingly apart from each other as the outcome accumulates towards a limit. Thus, the risk is that for each agent, say agent i, the sequence of reports of the other agents can make it increasingly difficult for agent i to grab some gains that he or she would be able to get if the other reports were fixed.
Thus, proving Theorem 5 requires two essential tasks. First, we need to understand what are the restrictions that are imposed on a profile of reports because it admits an envy-free allocation that is close to a certain outcome. Second, we need to understand what are the possibilities to manipulate an envy-free mechanism that arise because the profile satisfies these properties. We advance our understanding of these questions in Lemmas 9-11 (see Appendix), which allow us to prove the following theorem, which summarizes our findings. Essential to the proof of these lemmas and the theorem is Velez (2018)'s strengthened form of the Maximal Manipulation Theorem of Andersson et al. (2014a,b) and Fujinaka and Wakayama (2015) . This result identifies the supremum of the utility values that an agent can get by manipulating an envy-free mechanism given that the other agents' reports are fixed.
Consider a given allocation at which agent i envies another agent, say agent j. Let η > 0 be the additional rent that would have to be added to the rent of the room of agent j so agent i is indifferent between this allotment and her consumption. The theorem states that there are universal proportions ω 1 and ω 2 , i.e., they depend only on n and the maximal budget violation index, for which the following holds. There is a quasi-linear preference that agent i can report and guarantees that as long as an envy-free allocation is chosen for the preference report, her allotment will be at least as good as the worst of a rent rebate in her room of at least ω 1 η, or receiving the room of agent j but paying at most what j was paying plus ω 2 η.
where η > 0 is such that u i (r µ(j) + η, µ(j)) = u i (z i ).
Theorem 6 suggests that when reports are required to be in B, ε-equilibrium outcomes of the direct revelation game of an envy-free scf cannot converge, as ε vanishes, to an outcome that violates no-envy. If this were so, the gain from manipulation guaranteed by the theorem would have a lower bound above from zero as ε vanishes. The following Lemma formalizes this result.
Lemma 6. Let Q ⊆ D ⊆ B and g an envy-free scf defined on D N . Then for each u ∈ U N , each limit equilibrium outcome of (N, D N , g, u) belongs to F (u).
The converse of this result completes our proof of Theorem 5. 13 Lemma 7. Let Q ⊆ D ⊆ U and g an envy-free scf defined on D N . Then for each u ∈ U N , each z ∈ F (u) is a limit equilibrium outcome of (N, D N , g, u).
Discussion
We have shown that the operator of a maxmin utility envy-free direct revelation mechanism for rent division problems can enlarge the domain of 13 Note that Lemmas 6 and 7 together also imply Theorem 4. admissible reports from the quasi-linear domain to the budget constrained quasi-linear domain without losing its complexity and incentive properties. Perhaps the most interesting question that our study opens is to evaluate the extent to which a preference elicitation scheme as the one proposed in Sec. 3 can indeed deliver and allow agents to better inform the mechanism designer about their preferences and needs. This is a question of empirical and experimental nature that we leave for further research.
As outlined in the introduction, our complexity results generalize for other selections of the envy-free set. Note that the space of piece-wise linear functions is closed under positive affine linear transformations. Thus, our results directly apply to compute an envy-free allocation that maximizes an agent-wise positive affine linear transformation of utility. Or results also apply to the computation of an envy-free allocation that maximizes the minimum of a positive affine linear transformation of rent payments. More precisely, one can compute an allocation in arg max (r,σ)∈F (e) min a∈A (α a +β a r a ). To do so one only needs to replace in the linear programs of Algorithms 1 and 2 the constraints that maximize the minimum utility by the constraints that maximize the minimum transformed rent payments. These constraints are again linear functions of the choice variables in the program. One can also modify Algorithms 1 and 2 so they also handle the minimization of the maximum of an affine linear transformation of utilities, or an affine linear transformation of rents. This can be done by replacing the LPs in them with corresponding minimization programs where the minimal utility or minimal rent constraints are reversed. The reason all these generalizations are possible is because all of these selections from the envy-free set satisfy money monotonicity, i.e., starting from a given such allocation, each agent contributes in welfare terms due to an increase in rent . All of the properties of the maxmin utility envy-free allocations used in the proofs of Lemmas 3-5 are shared by these selections (Velez, , 2018 .
Finally, our results about incentives generalize to the following family of mechanisms. Let G ⊆ F be defined on a domain D, X ≡ X 1 × · · · × X n a message space, and ϕ :
The generalizes direct revelation mechanism associated with G, X, and ϕ, which we denote by (N, D N × X, (G, ϕ) ), is that in which each agent reports her preferences and a message (u i , x i ) ∈ D × X i , and the outcome is the allocation chosen by ϕ for the profile of reports. The complete information game induced by such a mechanism for some utility profile u ∈ U N is (N, D N × X, (G, ϕ), u). Note that this game is welldefined even if the true preference profile does not belong in the space of possible reports. The generalized direct revelation mechanisms include the tie-breaker mechanisms of Velez and Thomson (2012) and Velez (2011) , and the fair rent division on a budget algorithm of Procaccia et al. (2018) .
Appendix Proofs of complexity results
Proof of Lemma1. Let Λ > 0 be such that for each a ∈ A such that u i (r σ(i) , σ(i)) > u i (r a , a), log Λ + (n − 1) max i∈N,a∈A λ ia < i∈N λ iσ(i) .
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider a rebate and reshuffle at (r, σ), i.e., a vector x ≡ (x a ) a∈A ∈ R A ++ and an assignment µ : N → A that induce allocation (r − x, µ). Since u and r will not change in the course of this proof, for simplicity in the notation, for each i ∈ N , let λ ia ≡ λ ia (u, r) and λ ia ≡ λ ia (u, r, Λ) for some Λ satisfying the property in Lemma 1. The linearized economy of rebates and reshuffles with slopesλs is isomorphic to a quasi-linear economy in which preferences are given by (y a , a)
Let ε > 0 be such that (i) for each i ∈ N and each a ∈ A such that u i (r σ(i) , σ(i)) > u i (r a , a), we have that u i (r σ(i) , σ(i)) > u i (r a − 2ε, a); and (ii) for each (i, a) ∈ SB u (r), r a − ε > b i . This ε is well defined because preferences u are continuous. Fix δ ∈ (0, ε].
Step 1 : Let (y δ , γ) ∈ F (N, A,û, a∈A y δ a ) be such that a∈A exp(y δ a ) = δ. Let r δ ≡ (r a − exp(y δ a )) a∈A . We claim that (r δ , γ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m − δ). Since a∈A exp(y δ a ) = δ, and a∈A r a = m, then a∈A r δ a = m − δ. Since a∈A exp(y δ a ) = δ, for each a ∈ A, exp(y δ a ) < δ ≤ ε. Sinceû is quasi-linear and γ admits an envy-free allocation for an economy with preferencesû, γ maximizes the summation of values forû (Svensson, 1983) . By Lemma 1, γ is a perfect matching in F(r). Thus, (r a , a) . Since both (r γ(i) , γ(i)) and (r a , a) maximize u i among the bundles in (r, σ), we have thatλ
This happens if and only if logλ iγ
Step 2 : Let (r δ , γ) be a solution to
We claim that for each maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r), (r δ , µ) is a solution to (4). Since (r, σ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m), for each a ∈ A, r δ a < r a (Alkan et al., 1991; . By Lemma 1, Λ in our definition ofλs can be taken arbitrarily close to zero. Thus, we can suppose without loss of generality that for each a ∈ A such that u i (r σ(i) , σ(i)) > u i (r a , a) and each
For each a ∈ A, let y δ a ≡ log(r a −r δ a ). We claim that (y δ , γ) ∈ F (N, A,û, a∈A y a ).
where the first inequality holds because (r δ , γ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m − δ); the second and last hold because for each a ∈ A, r δ a < r a ; the third holds by the definition of ε; and the fourth holds because δ < ε. Since (r δ , γ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m − δ), γ(i) = a. Thus, u i (r γ(i) , γ(i)) = u i (r σ(i) , σ(i)). Thus, for each i ∈ N ,λ iµ(i) = λ iµ(i) . Thus, by (5) for each a ∈ A such that u i (r σ(i) , σ(i)) > u i (r a , a),
. By our choice of Λ and since µ is a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r), µ maximizes the summation of values for quasi-linear preferenceû. Thus, there is an allocation in F (N, A,û, a∈A y a ) with assignment µ (Alkan et al., 1991) . Thus, (y δ , µ) ∈ F (N, A,û, a∈A y a ) (Svensson, 2009 ). Since a∈A exp(y a ) = δ, by Step 1, (r δ , µ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m − δ). By Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991) ,
. Thus, (r δ , µ) is a solution to (4).
Step 3 : Concludes. Let µ be a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r). Consider the function δ ∈ [0, ε] → (r δ , µ) where (r 0 , µ) = (r, µ) and for each δ > 0, (r δ , µ) is a solution to (4). Since µ is a perfect matching in F(r), (r, µ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m). By Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991) , for
we have that (r, µ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m). Thus, for each δ ∈ [0, ε], (r δ , µ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m − δ). Thus, for each pair 0 < δ < η < ε, and each i ∈ N ,
, and for each a ∈ A, r δ a > r η a (Alkan et al., 1991; .
The following lemma allows us to easily prove Lemma 4. It's proof, which we omit, can be completed similarly to Step 1 in the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 8. Let u ∈ B N , ε > 0, (r, σ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m), and (t, σ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m − ε) such that for each a ∈ A, r a > t a . Suppose that B u (r) = B u (t). Then, there is Λ > 0 satisfying the property of Lemma 1, such that (r − t, σ) ∈ F N, A, (λ ia (u, r, Λ)(·)) i∈N,a∈A , a∈A r a − t a .
Proof of Lemma 4. By Lemma 8 there is a representation of preferencesû in the linearized rebates and reshuffles economy at r satisfying the property of Lemma 1, and such that (log(r−t), σ) ∈ F (N, A,û, a∈A log(r a −t a )). Sincê u is quasi-linear, σ maximizes the summation of the values forû (Svensson, 1983) . Thus, σ is a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r).
Proof of Lemma 5. Statement 1 follows from Lemma 3. Let ε ≡ ε((r, σ), u, µ). Suppose that 0 < ε < +∞. Then, there is a sequence {δ s } s∈N whose limit is ε and such that for each s ∈ N, there is r s ∈ R A such that (r s , µ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m − δ s ). For each δ > 0 there is a unique r δ ∈ R A for which there is an assignment γ such that (r δ , γ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m − δ) (Alkan et al., 1991; . Moreover, the function δ → ϕ(δ) ≡ r δ is continuous (Velez, 2017, Proposition 2) . Thus, as s → +∞, r s → r ε . Since u is continuous, (r ε , µ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m−ε). Let (r ε , γ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m−ε). By Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991) , for each i ∈ N , u i (r ε µ(i) , µ(i)) = u i (r ε γ(i) , γ(i)). Thus, (r ε , µ) ∈ F (N, A, u, m − ε). Let δ ∈ [0, ε). By definition of ε, there is η > δ such that for each δ ′ ∈ [0, η], there is r ′ ∈ R A such that (r ′ , µ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m − δ ′ ). Thus, there is r δ ∈ R A such that (r δ , µ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m − δ). Thus,
Thus,
We claim that µ is not a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r ε ). Suppose the contrary. By Lemma 3, there is η > 0 such that for each δ ∈ [0, η], there is r δ such that (r δ , µ) ∈ R(N, A, u, m − ε − δ). This contradicts, (6). Finally, suppose that η > ε. We claim that there is no t ∈ R A such that a∈A t a = m − η, B u (t) = B u (r ε ), and (t, µ) ∈ R(N, A, u r , m − η). Suppose by contradiction that there is r η ∈ R A such that a∈A r η a = m − η, (r η , µ) ∈ R(N, A, u r , m − η). Since η > ε, for each a ∈ A, r ε a > r η a (Alkan et al., 1991; . By Lemma 4, µ is a maximal weight perfect matching in F u (r ε ). This is a contradiction.
Proofs of results about incentives
Definition 5. For each u ∈ U N and i ∈ N let
The following lemma is used in the proof of the subsequent results.
Proof of Lemma 9. Let a ≡ µ(i) and (r ′ , γ) ∈ F i (u −i , v i ). By Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991) , r ′ a ≤ r a . Let u ′ i ∈ U be a preference that prefers (r ′ a , a) to all other bundles at (r ′ , γ), i.e., such that for each b ∈ A \ {a},
. By Fujinaka and Wakayama (Lemma 3, 2015) , r ′′ = r ′ . Thus, γ ′ (i) = a. Let δ > 0. By Velez (Statement 3, Theorem 5.15, 2018) 
Definition 6. The envy-free graph for u ∈ U and z ∈ Z is Γ(u, z) ≡ (N, E) where (i, j) ∈ E if and only if u i (z i ) = u i (z j ). If there is a path from i to j in Γ(u, z) we write i → u,z j.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let u ′ i ∈ U be a preference that prefers (r µ(j) , µ(j)) to all other bundles at (r, µ), i.e., such that for each a ∈ A \ {µ(j)},
Proof of Lemma 11. Fix a ∈ A, z ≡ (r, µ), and s ≡ (t, σ) as in the statement of the lemma. By Alkan et al. (Theorem 4 1991) , for each b ∈ A, t b < r b ; by Alkan et al. (Lemma 3, 1991) for each j ∈ N , u j (s j ) > u j (z j ).
Step 1:
where the first and last inequality hold because u j ∈ B(C).
Step 2:
where the first and last inequalities hold because u j ∈ B(C).
Step 3:
. Thus, j m = j l−1 . This contradicts {j 1 , ..., j m } are all different agents. Thus, either k = j or k ∈ N \ {j, j 1 , ..., j m }. In the former case, r σ(j) − t σ(j) ≤ (r σ(i) − t σ(i) )(1 + ρ) m+1 , which proves our step. In the later case let j m+1 = k. Thus, {j 1 , ..., j m+1 } ⊆ N \ {j} are all different agents. By Step 2, r µ(k) − t µ(k) ≤ (r σ(i) − t σ(i) )(1 + ρ) m+2 . Since N is finite, by repeating the preceding argument we eventually find that r σ(j) − t σ(j) ≤ (r σ(i) − t σ(i) )(1 + ρ) n .
Step 4: Concludes. Let i ∈ N be such that µ(i) = a. By Velez (Proposition 1 2011), for each j ∈ N , j → u,s i.
Since preferences are continuous and satisfy money-monotonicity there is a unique such a y and y > 0. There are two cases.
by reshuffling along the chain that defines j → v −i ,u i ,z i, at which agent i receives z j . By Lemma 9, for each ω 2 ∈ (0, 1) there is
It is not the case that j → v,z i. Let u ′ i ∈ U be a utility function that is indifferent between z i and for each j ∈ N \ {i}, (r µ(j) − x, µ(j)). By choosing x sufficiently large we can guarantee that for each j ∈ N \ {i}, if
Let
Then i ∈ M and for each k ∈ M and each h ∈ N \ M , u ′ h (z h ) > u ′ h (z k ). Since it is not the case that j → v,z i, it is not the case that j → u ′ ,z i. Thus, j ∈ L = ∅. Let ϕ be a function that assigns to each l ∈ R an allocation in ϕ(l) ∈ F µ(i) (M, µ(M ), u ′ M , l). For each b ∈ µ(M ), let r b (l) be the rent payment of the agent who receives room b at ϕ(l). Then, by Velez (Proposition 2 2017), r b is a continuous strictly increasing function and l → u ′ i (ϕ(l) i ) is a continuous strictly decreasing function. By Velez (2017, Corollary 1 and Proposition2), there is a function ψ that assigns to each l ∈ R and allocation ψ(l) ∈ F (L, µ(L), u L , l) such that (1) ψ( a∈µ(L) r a ) = z L , (2) if for each b ∈ µ(L) and each x ∈ R, r b (x) is the rent payment of the agent who receives room b at ψ(x), r b is a continuous strictly increasing function; and (3) for each i ∈ L, x → u i (ψ(x) i ) is a continuous strictly decreasing function. Let l M ≡ a∈µ(M ) r a and l L ≡ a∈µ(L) r a . Consider the set
Recall that for each k ∈ M and each h ∈ L, u ′ h (z h ) > u ′ h (z k ). Thus, 0 ∈ D and all the inequalities that define D hold strictly for δ = 0. Since for each b ∈ µ(M ), the function r b is continuous and for each k ∈ L, the function l → u ′ k (ψ(l) k ) is also continuous, there is δ > 0 in D. Since for each k ∈ M ,
Since F (u ′ ) is a compact set, D is bounded above. Let δ 1 be the supremum of D. By the same argument above, if all inequalities that define D are strict at δ 1 , there is δ > δ 1 in δ. Thus, δ 1 is the maximum of D. Let z 1 ≡ (r 1 , µ 1 ) ≡ (ϕ(l M − δ 1 ), ψ(l L + δ 1 )) ∈ F (u ′ ). Thus, there is h ∈ L and k ∈ M such that u h (z 1 h ) = u h (z 1 k ). Let i 1 be the agent who receives µ(i) at z 1 . Since z 1 M ∈ F µ(i) (M, µ(M ), u M , l M ), by Velez (Proposition 1 2011), for each k ∈ M , k → u ′ ,z 1 i 1 . Thus, there is h ∈ L such that l → u ′ ,z 1 i 1 . Let M 1 ≡ {k ∈ N : k → u ′ ,z 1 i 1 } and L = N \ M 1 . Since z 1 = (ϕ(l M − δ 1 ), ψ(l L + δ 1 )), M 1 M and µ 1 (M 1 ) µ(M ). By repeating this process 1 ≤ m ≤ n times, one constructs {z 0 ≡ (r 0 , µ 0 ), z 1 ≡ (r 1 , µ 1 ), ..., z m ≡ (r m , µ m )} ⊆ F (u ′ ) and {δ 1 , ..., δ m } all positive amounts, such that: (1) z 0 = z. (2) for each k ∈ {1, ..., m}, denote by i k the agent who receives object µ(i) at z k and by j k the agent who receives object µ(j) at z k , M k ≡ {h ∈ N : h → u ′ ,z k i k }, and Suppose that ∆ ≤ y/2. Since z m ∈ F (v −i , u ′ i ), by Lemma 10, there is v ′ i ∈ Q such that for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (v −i , v ′ i ), σ(i) = µ(j) and u i (s i ) ≥ u i r µ(j) + ∆ + y/4, µ(j) ≥ u i (r j + 3y/4, µ(j)). Finally, suppose that ∆ > y/2. Since z m ∈ F (v −i , u ′ i ), by Lemma 9, there is v ′ i ∈ Q such that for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (v −i , v ′ i ), σ(i) = µ(i) and u i (s i ) ≥ u i r µ(i) − θ∆ + θ∆/2, µ(i) = u i r µ(i) − θ∆/2, µ(i) Thus, for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (v −i , v ′ i ), u i (s i ) ≥ u i r µ(i) − θy/2, µ(i) . Summarizing, in all cases, there is v ′ i ∈ Q such that for each s ≡ (t, σ) ∈ F (v −i , v ′ i ), u i (s i ) ≥ min u i r µ(i) − θy/2, µ(i) , u i r µ(j) + 3y/4, µ(j) .
Proof of Lemma 6. Let z ≡ (r, µ) be a limit equilibrium of (N, D N , g, u). We t µ(i) > r µ(i) + ε/(n − 1). Since j∈N t µ(j) = j∈N r µ(j) , there is j ∈ N such that t µ(j) < r µ(j) − ε/(n − 1) 2 . Thus, u i (s j ) > u i (s i ) and s ∈ F (v ε ). This is a contradiction. Since for each i ∈ N , t µ(i) ≤ r µ(i) + ε/(n − 1), then for each i ∈ N , t µ(i) ≥ r µ(i) − ε. Let i ∈ N . By Fujinaka and Wakayama (Lemma 3, 2015) , for each s ∈ F i (v ε −i , u i ), t µ(i) ≥ r µ(i) − ε. Thus, for each s ∈ F i (v ε −i , u i ), u i (s i ) ≤ u i (z i ) + ε. By Fujinaka and Wakayama (Statement 1, Theorem 1, 2015), for each v ′ i ∈ U and each s ∈ F (v ε −i , v ′ i ), u i (s i ) ≤ u i (z i )+ε. Thus, for each v ′ i ∈ U and each
is such that u i (s i ) ≤ u i (z i ) + ε. Let (t ε , µ) = ϕ(v ε , x). Then, for each i ∈ N , r i − ε ≤ t ε i ≤ r i + ε/(n − 1). Thus, as ε vanishes, (t ε , µ) → z. Thus, z is a limit equilibrium of (N, D N , g, u) .
